Imogen Dickie develops an account of aboutness-fixing for thoughts about ordinary objects, and of reference-fixing for the singular terms we use to express them. Extant discussions of this topic tread a weary path through descriptivist proposals, causalist alternatives, and attempts to combine the most attractive elements of each. The account developed here is a new beginning. It starts with two basic principles, the first of which connects aboutness and truth, and the second of which connects truth and justification. These (...) principles combine to yield a third principle connecting aboutness and justification. Dickie uses the principle to explain how the relations to objects that enable us to think about them--perceptual attention; understanding of proper names; grasp of descriptions--do their aboutness-fixing and thought-enabling work. The book includes discussions of the nature of singular thought and the relation between thought and consciousness. (shrink)

"To be a philosopher and to be a feminist are one and the same thing. A feminist is a woman who does not allow anyone to think in her place."-from _Hipparchia's Choice_ A work of rare insight and irreverence, _Hipparchia's Choice_ boldly recasts the history of philosophy from the pre-Socratics to the post-Derrideans as one of masculine texts and male problems. The position of women, therefore, is less the result of a hypothetical "femininity" and more the fault of exclusion by (...) men. Nevertheless, women have been and continue to be drawn to "the exercise of thought." So how does a female philosopher become a conceptually adventurous woman? Focusing on the work of Sartre and Beauvoir (specifically, his sexism and her relation to it), Michèle Le Doeuff shows how women philosophers can reclaim a place for feminist concerns. Is _The Second Sex_ a work of philosophy, and, if so, what can it teach us about the relation of philosophy to experience? Now with a new epilogue, _Hipparchia's Choice_ points the way toward a discipline that is accountable to history, feminism, and society. (shrink)

According to a historical claim oft-repeated by contemporary epistemologists, the ‘traditional’ conception of knowledge prevailed in Western philosophy prior to the publication in 1963 of Edmund’s Gettier’s famous three-page article ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’. On this conception, knowledge consists of justified true belief. In this article, I critically consider evidence for and against this historical claim, and conclude with a puzzle concerning its widespread acceptance.

Over the last decade, businesses, policymakers, and researchers alike have advocated the need for value creation through inter-organizational collaboration. Researchers have widely argued that organizations that are engaged in collaborative processes create value. Because researchers have tended to focus on the identification of organizational motivations and on key success factors for collaboration, however, both the nature and processes of value creation in inter-organizational collaboration have yet to be examined. A recent theory by Austin and Seitanidi :726–758, 2012a; Nonprofit Volunt Sect (...) Q 41:929–968, 2012b) has proposed an analytical framework for analyzing value creation in inter-organizational collaboration, based on four types of value. The purpose of this current study is to empirically test this framework, and to provide key pointers for analyzing the nature of value, particularly in relation to learning. Our detailed empirical research is based on a 6-year retrospective case study of an inter-organizational partnership within an international development project for local economic development in Guatemala. The study’s contributions are twofold. First, it provides evidence of the critical path of the creation of diverse types of values in a collaborative process; second, it links the different types of value creation with the types of learning that occur in an inter-organizational process. (shrink)

Does chemistry reduce to physics? If this means ‘Can we derive the laws of chemistry from the laws of physics?’, recent discussions suggest that the answer is ‘no’. But sup posing that kind of reduction—‘epistemological reduction’—to be impossible, the thesis of ontological reduction may still be true: that chemical properties are determined by more fundamental properties. However, even this thesis is threatened by some objections to the physicalist programme in the philosophy of mind, objections that generalize to the chemical case. (...) Two objections are discussed: that physicalism is vacuous, and that nothing grounds the asymmetry of dependence which reductionism requires. Although it might seem rather surprising that the philosophy of chemistry is affected by shock waves from debates in the philosophy of mind, these objections show that there is an argumentative gap between, on the one hand, the theoretical connection linking chemical properties with properties at the sub-atomic level, and, on the other, the philosophical thesis of ontological reduction. The aim of this paper is to identify the missing premises (among them a theory of physical possibility) that would bridge this gap. Introduction: missing elements and the mystery of discreteness The refutation of physicalism A combinatorial theory of physical possibilia Combinatorialism and the Bohr model Objections The missing premises and a disanalogy with mind. (shrink)

This article explores the social benefits and moral arguments in favour of women and couples freezing eggs and embryos for social reasons. Social IVF promotes equal participation by women in employment; it offers women more time to choose a partner; it provides better opportunities for the child as it allows couples more time to become financially stable; it may reduce the risk of genetic and chromosomal abnormality; it allows women and couples to have another child if circumstances change; it offers (...) an option to women and children at risk of ovarian failure; it may increase the egg and embryo pool. There are strong arguments based on equal concern and respect for women which require that women have access to this new technology. Freezing eggs also avoids some of the moral objections associated with freezing embryos. (shrink)

Reproduit quatre conférences faites en 1946 et 1947 sous ce titre au Collège de philosophie, et interroge la notion de temps comme limitation même de l'être fini ou comme relation de l'être fini à Dieu (Electre).

What is agnosticism? Is it a belief, or just the absence of belief? What is the 'agnostic' principle? Robin Le Poidevin takes a philosophical approach to the issue of agnosticism, challenging some of the common assumptions, arguing in favour of the agnostic attitude, and considering its place in society and education.

Crispin Sartwell ingeniously defends the provocative thesis that mere true belief suffices for knowledge. In doing so, he challenges one of the most deeply entrenched epistemological tenets, namely that knowledge must be more than mere true belief. Particularly interesting is the way he defends his thesis by appealing to considerations adduced by such prominent epistemologists as William Alston, Laurence BonJour, Alvin Goldman and Paul Moser, each of whom denies that knowledge is merely true belief. In this paper, I argue that (...) the case Sartwell presents for his thesis fails. However, by examining why it fails, we may derive at least four important epistemological lessons: being justified does not entail being able to give a justification; we should distinguish between epistemic justification conceived of as intrinsically conducive to truth and conceived of as extrinsically conducive to truth; we should distinguish between epistemic justification conceived of as an essential criterion of knowledge and conceived of as an accidental criterion of knowledge ; and epistemologists need to specify how the telos of inquiry involves more than the acquisition of true beliefs.Socrates: Then tell me: what definition can we give with the least risk of contradicting ourselves? (shrink)

One of the most venerable and enduring intuitions in epistemology concerns the relationship between true belief and knowledge. Famously articulated by Socrates, it holds that true belief does not suffice for knowledge. I discuss a matching intuition about ignorance according to which true belief does not suffice for the absence of ignorance. I argue that the latter intuition undercuts the New View of Ignorance and supports the Standard View of Ignorance.

La vieille question du statut ontologique du présent refait aujourd’hui surface au travers du débat qui oppose présentisme et éternisme. Les présentistes défendent la thèse selon laquelle seul ce qui est présent existe. Les éternistes soutiennent quant à eux que le présent ne jouit d’aucun privilège ontologique, les choses passées et futures existant tout autant que les choses présentes. Dans cet article nous ne chercherons pas à départager les protagonistes mais à écarter les théories dites « hybrides » qui prétendent (...) bénéficier des avantages de chacune des positions sans hériter de leurs inconvénients. Nous commencerons par retracer le débat entre présentisme et éternisme (section 1), puis nous présenterons les motivations des défenseurs des théories hybrides (section 2). Enfin, dans notre dernière section, nous avancerons un argument qui, s’il est juste, montre que les théories hybrides ne sont pas cohérentes. (shrink)

According to the Ignorance Factivity Thesis, for every proposition p, one is ignorant of p only if p is a truth. By contrast, according to the Ignorance Non-Factivity Thesis, it is false that, for every proposition p, one is ignorant of p only if p is a truth. I argue that, on balance, the case for the latter thesis is stronger than the case for the former.

La pertinence de la métaphysique analytique a fait l'objet de critiques : Ladyman et Ross, par exemple, ont suggéré d'abandonner ce domaine. French et McKenzie ont défendu la métaphysique analytique en affirmant qu'elle développe des outils qui pourraient s'avérer utiles pour la philosophie de la physique. Dans cet article, nous montrons dans un premier temps que cette défense heuristique de la métaphysique peut être étendue au domaine scientifique de l'ontologie appliquée, qui utilise des théories et outils issus de la métaphysique (...) analytique. Dans un deuxième temps, nous développons le parallèle que font French et McKenzie entre les mathématiques et la métaphysique pour montrer que l'ensemble du domaine de la métaphysique analytique, étant donné son utilité non seulement pour la philosophie mais également pour la science, devrait continuer à exister en tant que domaine largement autonome. (shrink)

This paper explores and articulates an alternative to the two main approaches that have come to predominate in contemporary philosophical discussionsof skepticism. These we may call the ‘Foil Approach’ and the ‘Bypass Approach’ respectively. On the Foil Approach, skepticism is treated as a problem to be solved, or challenge to be met, or threat to be parried; skepticism’s value, insofar as it is deemed to have one, accrues from its role as a foil contrastively illuminating what is required for knowledge (...) and justified belief. On the Bypass Approach, skepticism is bypassed as a central concern of epistemology. In this paper, I articulate an alternative to both these approaches, one that explores when skepticism is healthy and when it is not. I call it the ‘Health Approach’ to skepticism. (shrink)

E. J. Lowe sets out in a recent paper1 to refute McTaggart's proof of the unreality of time, by exposing an ‘indexical fallacy’ in his disproof of the existence of tensed (i. e., A-series) facts.2 Lowe then develops an original account of what makes time the dimension of change, based on his own account of tensed facts. But in our opinion he fails on both counts: (1) he fails to refute McTaggart's perfectly sound disproof of tensed facts, which shows that (...) time can be real only if (Lowe and McTaggart not withstanding) it needs no tensed facts, and (2) he fails to explain the temporal character of change, since his account of it has an exact spatial analogue. In what follows we argue these two points in turn. (shrink)

Les Cyniques grecs ne nous ont pas l gu de savants trait s. Leur philosophie, plut t pragmatique, s'exprimait par l'observance d'une vie asc tique franchement marginale. Le lecteur d couvrira dans ces fragments qui leur sont attribu s, dans ces t moignages de contemporains, pr sent s ici dans leur version fran aise, l'univers et l'id al des Cyniques. Le texte de cette nouvelle dition a t enti rement revu par l'auteur. Les recherches effectu es depuis la premi re (...) publication (1975) ont permis de compl ter plusieurs sections et d'y inclure des fragments nouveaux et des traductions r centes. Une bibliographie enti rement r vis e et deux nouveaux index viennent compl ter l'ouvrage. (shrink)

Are we the people we were? If we are continuants, then the answer to this question is an affirmative one. But it is a moot point whether anything is a continuant. The debate over this issue—of whether there are such things as continuants—is often conducted in the context of theories concerning the apparent passage of time. Thus it has been argued that the tenseless theory of time, according to which time does not really pass, forces us to tear down part (...) of the basis for the intuitive distinction between ordinary, reidentifiable objects on the one hand, and processes on the other, and to regard such objects as mountains as persisting through time in exactly the way that thunderstorms do: by having distinct temporal parts at different times. I confess that I am a tenseless theorist of time, and take that theory to entail such a conclusion about the persistence of objects. But it is not just a certain stance over time’s passage that motivates sympathy towards temporal parts and suspicion of continuants. Thinking of objects as having temporal parts sits more comfortably than does the rival view with two natural assumptions concerning continuity: that beginning and ceasing to exist, at least for most objects, involves underlying changes which are continuous in nature; and that objects exhibit continuity through time, in the sense of not having gaps in their existence. Or so I shall argue in what follows. (shrink)

Die Hauptthese des Buches besteht darin, "die Zeit nicht als eine Abwertung der Ewigkeit zu denken, sondern als Verhältnis zu demjenigen, was, als von sich aus Unangleichbares, absolut Anderes, sich nicht durch die Erfahrung angleichen läßt, oder als Verhältnis zu dem, was, als von sich aus Unendliches, sich nicht begreifen läßt". Der Andere steht zum Ich im Verhältnis der Nicht-Gleichzeitigkeit (Diachronie), der "Distanz, die Nähe ist". Paradigmen solcher uneinholbaren Anderheit sind der Tod und das Weibliche. Levinas zeigt jedoch in "Le (...) temps et l'autre", wie es im Verhältnis zur Anderheit ein Durchbrechen der in sich verschlossenen Einsamkeit, ein wirkliches Transzendieren gibt, das nicht mehr Rückkehr des Selben zu sich ist. Die deutsche Übersetzung erschien 1984 erstmals im Felix Meiner Verlag und wurde von Ludwig Wenzler für die Neuausgabe (nun in der Philosophischen Bibliothek) korrigiert. (shrink)

The social environment influences what information individuals sample: people are often exposed to alternatives that are popular. This can systematically change an individual's evaluation of an alternative if she had previously been avoiding it due to a negative evaluation. The authors show that social exposure can have positive or negative effects on evaluation, depending on how popularity and prior evaluations interact. This theory was supported by a large‐scale analysis of data from a hotel chain.

L'éternalisme, la thèse selon laquelle les entités que nous catégorisons comme étant passées, présentes et futures existent tout autant, est la meilleure approche ontologique de l'existence temporelle qui soit en accord avec les théories de la relativité restreinte et de la relativité générale. Cependant, les théories de la relativité restreinte et générale ne sont pas fondamentales si bien que plusieurs programmes de recherche tentent de trouver une théorie plus fondamentale de la gravité quantique rassemblant tous les enseignements de la physique (...) relativiste et de la physique quantique. Certaines de ces approches soutiennent que le temps n'est pas fondamental. Toutefois, si le temps n'est pas fondamental, quelles en sont les conséquences pour l'éternalisme et les débats sur l'existence dans le temps ? Premièrement, je soutiendrai que la non-fondamentalité du temps que l'on rencontre dans la théorie des cordes mène à l'éternalisme standard. Deuxièmement, je soutiendrai que la non-fondamentalité du temps rencontrée dans la gravité quantique à boucles implique l'éternalisme atemporel, à savoir une nouvelle position qui demeure fidèle à l'esprit de l'éternalisme standard. (shrink)

Une negation qui se voudrait absolue, mais niant tout existant -jusqu'a l'existant qu'est la pensee effectuant cette negation meme-ne saurait mettre fin a la scene toujours ouverte de l'etre, de l'etre au sens verbal: etre anonyme qu'aucun etant ne revendique, etre sans etants ou sans etres, incessant remue-menage, pour reprendre une metaphore de Blanchot, il y a impersonnel, comme un il pleut ou un il fait nuit. Terme foncierement distinct du es gibt heideggerien. Il n'a jamais ete ni la traduction, (...) ni la demarque de l'expression allemande et de ses connotations d'abondance et de generosite. Il faut insister sur le caractere desertique, obsedant et horrible de l'il y a et sur son inhumaine neutralite. Neutralite a surmonter. Sortie recherchee dans ce livre. Analyses esquissees dans ce sens de la relation a autrui. (shrink)

First of all, I have spoken so far of the history of Greek thought. It would be more correct to speak of Graceo-Roman thought. Certainly, the Latins were not inventors, in science or in philosophy. But, if one thinks of what our knowledge of Greek ...

ObjectiveTo explore the effect of modified constraint-induced movement therapy on upper limbs residual dysfunction for infancy with the sequelas of unilateral brachial plexus injury.MethodsSingle blind randomized controlled trial of mCIMT vs. standard care. An enrolling 31 infants with a uBPI exhibiting residual dysfunction of the affected upper limb for over 6 months was conducted. And functional outcomes pertaining to the affected upper limb were assessed via AMS, GRES, RHS, and MSS at 0, 3, and 6 months after treatment.ResultsNo differences were (...) found in baseline AMS, MSS, GRES, or RHS between the control and mCIMT groups [F = 0.062, P = 0.086; F = 0.483, P = 0.499; F = 0.272, P = 0.610; Z = −0.336, P = 7.373]. At the 3- and 6-month follow-up time points, AMS, MSS, and GRES scores were significantly improved over baseline in both groups [mCIMT: F = 183.750, 128.614, 110.085, P < 0.05; Control: F = 204.007, 75.246, 51.070, P < 0.05]. No significant differences were found between two treatment groups at the 3-month follow-up time point [F = 0.565, P = 0.465; F = 0.228, P = 0.641; F = 0.713, P = 0.413; Z = −0.666, P = 0.505]. However, at the 6-month follow-up time point, AMS and MSS scores were significantly improved in the mCIMT group relative to the control group [F = 8.077, P = 0.013; F = 18.692, P = 0.001].ConclusionmCIMT may benefit the rehabilitation of residual upper limb dysfunction associated with a uBPI in infants.Clinical Trial Registration[www.chictr.org.cn], identifier [ChiCTR1900022119]. (shrink)

The UK Medical Research Council (MRC) takes the issue of conflict of interest very seriously. The overall aim is to preserve a climate in which personal and organisational innovation can flourish while ensuring that potential conflicts are disclosed and identified and conflicts are either avoided or managed with integrity. The approach needs to encompass the MRC’s various responsibilities and the levels at which conflicts might arise: MRC staff (scientists and administrators); the governing Council; research Boards and committees; external peer-reviewers; and (...) applicants for funding. To achieve its goals, the MRC has issued practical guidance on various aspects of conflict of interest. For the future, the MRC has identified the continuing commercialisation of science and the increasing involvement of lay people in scientific decision-making as special challenges in this area. (shrink)

This paper offers a novel argument for superspace substantivalism. _Superspace_ is a modified spacetime represented formally through combining ordinary spatial dimensions with anticommuting dimensions whose coordinates are labelled in Grassmann numbers rather than real numbers. At supersymmetric worlds, physical laws exhibit _supersymmetry_—viz., a symmetry that transforms bosons into fermions and vice versa. _Superspace substantivalism_ is the thesis that, at supersymmetric worlds, among the most fundamental structures is superspace. Initially, the focus will be on a prevalent doctrine in the philosophy of (...) physics literature which I call the _mimetic ideal_. On the mimetic ideal, interpreting physical theories aims primarily at specifying their _ontology_, namely at achieving accurate _reference_ (in natural-language accounts of those theories) or _representation_ (in model-theoretic portrayals of those theories) with respect to aspects of physical reality. However, I show that the mimetic ideal doesn’t seem able to account for important aspects of physics practice (Sect. 2 ). In Sect. 3, therefore, I articulate and defend a new, _diegetic ideal_, according to which the interpretation of physical theories should aim at _perspectival coordination_ between interpreters and practising physicists. Perspectival coordination, in the context of interpreting physical theories, means that interpreters and practising physicists share a perspective or a point of view on some aspect of physical reality described by that theory. In Sect. 4, I apply this analysis to the study of supersymmetric quantum field theories (QFTs): reframing the realist framework which underlies Baker’s (2020) agnosticism, I examine the exciting upshot that superspace substantivalism is true. I conclude with some reflections on what perspectival coordination means for realism (Sect. 5 ). (shrink)

Consider the agnostic who thinks that reason and evidence are neutral on the question of God’s existence, and as a result neither believes that God exists nor believes that God does not exist. Can such an agnostic live a genuinely religious life – even one in which God is the central animating idea? They might do so by accepting Pascal’s Wager: the expected rewards will always be greater if one bets on God’s existence than if one does not. Or they (...) might accept William James’s argument that religious beliefs are properly activated by our passional nature. But both of these routes involve abandoning the initial agnosticism, and so are open to charges of irrationality. In this paper I explore a third route to the religious life, suggested by Pascal’s discussion, one which uses fiction and make-believe as the central prop. It might seem that this too entails abandoning agnosticism in favour of the view that religion just is fiction. I suggest, however, that there is a phenomenon which I term “serious make-believe” in which one can remain agnostic about whether the object of make-believe is real or a useful fiction. Applied to religion, the result is a religious life that is both genuinely engaged and yet, by remaining agnostic, cannot be accused of irrationality. (shrink)

In the broadest sense of the phrase, there is action at a distance whenever there is a spatial or temporal gap between a cause and its effect. In this sense, it is not at all controversial that there is action at a distance. To cite a few instances: the page a few inches in front of you is impinging on your senses; the Sun is now warming the Earth; we are still living with the consequences of the Second World War. (...) What is controversial is the idea of unmediated action at a distance, where there is both a gap between cause and effect and no intermediate causes and effects to fill it. The three examples just mentioned are cases of action at a distance, certainly, but not, surely, unmediated action at a distance. What we expect to find, in each case, is a spatially and temporally continuous causal series stretching across time and space. (shrink)

Background Relational autonomy is an alternative concept of autonomy in which an individual is recognized as embedded into society and influenced by relational factors. Social context, including social location, political structure, and social forces, significantly influence an agent to develop and exercise autonomy skills. The relational approach has been applied in clinical practice to identify relational factors impacting patient autonomy and decision-making, yet there is a knowledge gap in how these factors influence the demonstration of relational autonomy in the context (...) of medical decisions of adults. Objective The present study targeted the existing knowledge of what and how relational factors impact individuals making medical decisions using the theoretical framework of relational autonomy. Methods A meta-synthesis study was utilized. Four electronic databases, including Embase, OVID Medline, CINAHL, and PubMed, were searched, along with gray literature and reference lists, to identify relevant studies. Results 23 studies reporting 21 qualitative and two mixed-method studies were reviewed. Four themes emerged from the qualitative findings: (1) supportive relationships facilitate an individual’s relational autonomy; (2) obtaining comprehensive information from broader sources helps individuals exercise relational autonomy; (3) undue family pressure impedes the exercising of patient relational autonomy; and (4) healthcare providers’ dominant voice hampers the demonstration of relational autonomy. Conclusions Applying relational autonomy to assist adults in making well-considered decisions is essential. The meta-synthesis suggests establishing a supportive relationship between individuals, healthcare providers, and family. A supportive relationship will allow healthcare providers to make judgments in line with an individual’s values and wishes with the aim of promoting relational autonomy. Advance care planning was proposed as the effective solution to obtain a consensus between individuals and their families while respecting an individual’s values and preferences. Furthermore, it is considered crucial for healthcare providers to appreciate an individual's values and incorporate their preferences into recommendations. (shrink)

A hitherto unexamined problem for the ‘‘Kantian ideal’’ that one should always treat patients as ends in themselves, and never only as a means to other ends, is explored in this paper. The problem consists of a prima facie conflict between this Kantian ideal and the reality of medical practice. This conflict arises because, at least presently, medical practitioners can only acquire certain skills and abilities by practising on live, human patients, and given the inevitability and ubiquity of learning curves, (...) this learning requires some patients to be treated only as a means to this end. A number of ways of attempting to establish the compatibility of the Kantian Ideal with the reality of medical practice are considered. Each attempt is found to be unsuccessful. Accordingly, until a way is found to reconcile them, we conclude that the Kantian ideal is inconsistent with the reality of medical practice. (shrink)

Fatalistic arguments have a long history. Fatalism invites people to look at their metaphysical ideas about time itself, and asks whether there is anything in those ideas that represents a threat to human freedom. The chapter begins by taking a look at the traditional fatalistic argument, and seeing where it fails. It then analyzes recent answers to two questions: Is the future real? Does time really pass? It explores how, together, they constitute a dilemma. The chapter then discusses fallacies of (...) fatalism, and passage and permanence in detail. Finally, it ends by canvassing some possible defenses of metaphysical freedom. If the direction of time is defined by the direction of causation, we can continue to say that when a cause occurs its effect is still indeterminate, and the cause is what it is that subsequently makes the effect determinate. (shrink)

L'Homme, cet être vivant doué de raison, fabricant d'objets élaborés, doté d'un langage articulé, chez lequel a émergé la pensée conceptuelle et symbolique, se caractérise par une aptitude à l'émerveillement, et une capacité d'espérance accompagnée d'un refus de l'absurde. Avec l'invention de l'outil manufacturé et les premiers témoignages d'une pensée symbolique, comment la fabuleuse aventure culturelle et spirituelle de l'Homme a-t-elle débuté? Pourquoi à travers les temps, même les plus anciens, et dans toutes les cultures, l'émergence du sens de la (...) transcendance n'a-t-il cessé de se manifester et de s'inscrire au coeur de notre humanité? Comment est-il devenu une caractéristique de l'Homme, une de ses aspirations profondes? Comment définir le sens du sacré? C'est de cette dimension intrinsèquement humaine, et des traces qu'elle a laissées, qu'il est ici question. Après L'Univers, la Vie et l'Homme : émergence du sens de la Conscience et Le Beau, l'Art et l'Homme : émergence du sens de l'Esthétique, voici le troisième et dernier opus dirigé par Henry de Lumley, issu d'un cycle de conférences au Collège des Bernardins. L'ambition de ces rencontres? Faire dialoguer physiciens, astrophysiciens, géologues, biologistes, paléoanthropologues, préhistoriens, historiens de l'art, philosophes et théologiens autour de questions qui ont trait à l'essence de l'humanité. (shrink)